Political polarisation in Albania has taken off again, which makes the continuation of major reform even more difficult with the risk of slowing the opening of membership negotiations. The extraordinary influence that the European Union and the USA had to exercise to exit the stalemate also reflects powerful reticence about the establishment of the rule of law, Mr. Pierre Mirel, Director at the European Commission 2001-2013 (DG Enlargement), has said.
Mr. Mirel made that comment answering questions put by Albanian Daily News on his comprehensive lengthy analysis entitled "The Western Balkans: between Stabilisation and Integration in the European Union" published on January 22, 2018, in the European Issue No. 459 of the Robert Schuman Foundation. (The original French version of the Foundation's publication can be read on its website).
Accession by the Western Balkans to the European Union is one of the priorities of the Bulgarian Presidency of the Council that has just started. Mr. Pierre Mirel recalls the vital conditions required for regional stabilisation and integration into the European Union. "It is time for the Union to launch a strong initiative to make its re-engagement in the Western Balkans even firmer," pointed out Mr. Mirel, former EC Director for Western Balkans, answering ADN's questions:

- Mr. Mirel, in your analysis, you recall the vital conditions required for regional stabilisation and integration into the EU. According to your deep insight, how much operative has the European "prospect" been since the Thessaloniki Summit?
- Only Croatia has become a Member of the Union (1st July 2013). Montenegro and Serbia have been engaged in membership negotiations since 2012 and 2014 respectively. Albania and Macedonia are 'candidate' countries. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo are still "potential candidates". Did the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) not meet expectations of the Thessaloniki Summit since stabilisation is still not complete and the path to integration is still long? Is the European "prospect" inoperative? But here we are forgetting that the bloody dismantling of Yugoslavia (100,000 deaths and 2 million refugees) led to "incomplete States", to border disputes, to difficult reconciliation and ethnic cohabitation. And we are forgetting that the rule of law and good governance are often ignored by the political elites who are more enamoured with power than reform.
On the other hand, we would not find a wide consensus for EU membership in the Western Balkans as existed in Central Europe. Apart from the weakening of the Union, the reasons for this are multiple: a share of the political class is more concerned by power and its short term gains, which is not precipitating reform and leaves some regions in dire circumstances, in slow transition, which limits investments and benefits corruption as well as organised crime; very high unemployment, which is forcing young people to leave, whilst a drastic decline in the population is possible; Roma living in miserable conditions are often asylum seekers; the return of hard ethno-nationalism is impeding sovereignty and the construction of the State. Yet the voluntary transfer of elements of national sovereignty implied by membership means that the candidate has to be sovereign and speaks with one voice. The paradox of this process is that candidates must build their State and establish their sovereignty, a part of which they will transfer to the European Union! And it is a paradox for the Union itself, which helps build States whose competences it will receive! The temptation is great to retain power via clientelism, control of the media and abuse of "ethnic" values and minorities brandishing the fear of the other. The Balkans are a mosaic of minorities. Albania has acknowledged nine, and Serbia 20 which each have a National Council to defend their rights. The balance remains delicate between minority rights and national cohesion.

- Many agreements have been concluded under the guidance of the EU in an attempt to materialize the integration process of the WB countries. Could you please list some of these accords which have been effective in the course of time?
- The European Council of Cologne (3rd- 4th June 1999) adopted the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), "a new type of contract offering a prospect of joining the European Union when the criteria defined in Copenhagen are fulfilled". At the European Council of Feira in June 2000, all of the States received the status of "potential candidates". This perspective was confirmed at the Summit of Zagreb on 24th November 2000 and especially at that of Thessaloniki on 21st June 2003, which defined the "agenda for the Western Balkans." A founding summit, it formalised the accession process on the basis of a double conditionality. In addition to the Copenhagen criteria there came, in effect, specific conditions which resulted from the painful legacy of the recent wars: full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia -ICTY - regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations between States and their neighbours. The tools of the fifth enlargement were transposed to the Balkans, political dialogue and a free-trade area in the Stabilisation and Association agreements (SAA), technical and financial assistance, reform priorities in "European partnerships" and preparation by the countries in question of "national programmes for the adoption of the "community acquis".
At the same time the Union launched the Stability Pact in Cologne in June 1999, to facilitate democratisation, development, cooperation and security in the Balkans in the ilk of the Helsinki Charter. Officially launched on 29th and 30th July in Sarajevo it formed the foundation of many agreements and cooperation networks in the areas of police work, justice, transport and trade. A free-trade agreement between the countries was signed in December 2006 which took the name of the one that linked the countries of Central Europe in the 1990's, the Central European Free-Trade Agreement (CEFTA). The Stability Pact was replaced by the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) on 11th May 2007, created by ten countries in the Cooperation Process in South East Europe: the five countries, which then comprised the Western Balkans, and the five neighbouring countries: Bulgaria, Greece, Moldova, Romania and Turkey. Based in Sarajevo and mainly financed by the EU the RCC became a major player in terms of regional cooperation.
The Western Balkans were also the testing ground for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Following the Ohrid Agreement (8th August 2001) that brought the nascent civil war between the Slav majority and the Albanian minority in Macedonia to an end, the EU ensured their supervision by the Concordia Mission. In Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), the Union's Police Mission replaced that of the UN, and the military mission EUFOR/Althea took over from the NATO mission provided for in the Dayton Agreements. In line with the SAP the Stabilisation and Association Agreements were signed with all countries. But their entry into force after ratification by the Member States- came much later for Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

- Speaking in concrete terms what do the figures show on the EU contribution to WB countries?
- It was in terms of trade that the agreements were the most effective. Exports from the Balkans increased by 89% between 2007 and 2016 towards the Union (17.7 billion euros) whilst exports from the latter have risen by 42% (26 billion euros). In part the negative balance reflects productive investments for economic modernisation. These agreements are therefore vital for trade and for integration into the Union's market, which represents 76% of their trade in all.
As for financial aid, an important part of the SAP, a total 20 billion euros, humanitarian aid aside, was allocated by the Union between 1995 and 2020. In July 1996, the OBNOVA programme (Reconstruction) committed 400 million euros. The CARDS programme (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stability) took over after that with 4.65 billion euros for the period 2000-2006. The IPA (Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance) is a combination of the various types of assistance since 2007. Provided with 3.74 billion euros for bilateral assistance over the period 2014-2020 to which we can add 2.96 billion for regional programmes, it offers technical and financial assistance, notably with the International financial Institutions. It also supports civil society, cross-border cooperation, transitional justice and reconciliation, refugee return and housing, the integration of the Roma communities.
At the same time, visa obligations for short stays (90 days) in the Schengen Area were lifted in 2009 for Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia and in 2010 for Albania and Bosnia Herzegovina after stringent reforms that followed the implementation of the agreements linked to facilitation and readmission. Kosovo still has not fulfilled the conditions, particularly the ratification of the agreement on the border with Montenegro.

- Which are some of the crises having hit the EU that might have undermined the Union's soft power in the Western Balkans, and, in your view, has the �European model� weakened in the eyes of the people of that region creating space for other powers to fill in the vacuum?
- The Union's policies with its neighbours are also part of a tumultuous European situation. The economic crisis has weakened the "European model" and limited its assistance capacities. Its leadership has been challenged by re-emerging countries like Russia, Turkey and China. According to Jean-Claude Juncker, the migratory crisis has broken the links of solidarity. Europe's values are under challenge by the "illiberal" governments of Budapest and Warsaw. The legitimacy of the "European system" is in crisis as it finds itself at odds with part of public opinion, including that of the United Kingdom, which decided on 23rd June 2016 to leave the Union.
All these crises are undoubtedly undermining the Union's soft power in the Western Balkans.

- Mr. Mirel, some 27 years have elapsed since the fall of dictatorial regime in Albania, but transition to democracy is still incomplete. What prevents the end of transition and feeds political polarisation in this Balkan country?
- Emerging from the dictatorial regime of Enver Hoxha - comparable to that of North Korea - Albania has experienced a difficult transition marked by extreme polarisation between the Democratic Party (DP) and the Socialist Party (SP), the boycott of the Assembly by one or the other and powerful groups of organised crime. A positive break did however occur in 2016 with the unanimous adoption in July of constitutional amendments for legal reform by the Assembly, notably including a historic vetting procedure of magistrates before their re-appointment or exclusion. In the European Union's negative opinion to Albania's membership request made in November 2010, this reform was indeed requested in exchange for candidate status. This was granted by the Council in June 2014. All the more as there is a wide public support to the process.
The old members of the DP tried for a last time to prevent legal reform in February 2017 with a ferocious campaign against the vetting of magistrates and its boycott of Parliament and the demand for a government of technocrats until the elections in June 2017. An agreement between its young leader, Lulzim Basha, and Prime Minister Edi Rama brought the boycott to an end. The elections led to a very clear majority for the SP and the vetting process was launched.
But political polarisation has taken off again, which makes the continuation of major reform even more difficult with the risk of slowing the opening of membership negotiations. The extraordinary influence that the European Union and the USA had to exercise to exit the stalemate also reflects powerful reticence about the establishment of the rule of law.

- How would you evaluate the 'Berlin Process' as part of EU reengagement in WB?
- This process is positive indeed. After Berlin, Vienna took over, the process continued in Paris, and the Trieste Summit on 12th July 2017 established the Berlin Process in real, much expected initiatives. And so the Union has re-engaged via real regional projects since the SAP alone cannot guarantee more stability to the Western Balkans and the perspective of accession is still a far off goal for some. Yet their stability is vital whilst the "Balkan Route" places these countries at the heart of migration to Europe.
In its enlargement strategy, expected in February, the Commission will explain how 2018 will be "a unique opportunity", with a roadmap for Serbia and Montenegro to continue their membership process and via proposals to open negotiations under certain conditions with Macedonia, and with Albania whose courageous reforms cannot be ignored.
Stability in the Western Balkans will indeed be greatly secured by the accession of Serbia and Albania, since Croatia has already become a member; the Albania we are talking about here is not only designated for its own merits, but also as an influential State, which is listened to in Kosovo and by the Albanian minorities and also as proof that the Union does not rule out a State with a Muslim majority.

- Would it be enough to stabilise the WB and lead them to integration into the EU?
- Is the European Union's new awareness of the Balkans enough for the long awaited reforms to be launched and for them to become permanent? It seems not, because financing is far too low in view of the needs and expectations. Bulgaria and Serbia have the same sized population. But 11.7 billion euros are planned for the former in 2014-2020 in comparison with 1.5 under the IPA for the latter, i.e. a ratio of one to eight. Serbia will undoubtedly receive eight times more one day. But it is now that it needs more funds. It is time to end the division between new member countries to whom too much is paid for the sums even to be absorbed and candidate countries which cruelly lack the means to succeed their transition. The credibility of the Union vis-�-vis its citizens, investors and in the face of the re-emerging countries depends on this. The price of instability is always very high. Stability can also be bought via increased financing.
It is high time that the Union create a significant, temporary (2019-2020) "Connectivity Fund" from the European budget - which is also open to education and healthcare - before it becomes a permanent part of the multi-annual financial framework 2021-2027, to a total that matches the needs and issues at stake, both geostrategic and economic; i.e. opening post-membership programmes to the candidate countries and notably the Cohesion Fund. Financing would however be made under conditions: the States would have the right to draw on them if real progress in chapters 23 and 24 were made and for which everyone would have to prepare an action plan. This conditionality would stimulate reform and lead to virtuous competition between the States to benefit from the financing. Moreover, after accession European funds would be conditioned on the respect of European values and the principles of the rule of law.
Secondly, priority should be given to the economy via the speedy implementation of the regional economic zone. As for the countries whose membership prospects remain distant, maintaining the illusion of a fast process will simply increase frustration. Also, a roadmap should be drafted so that they can integrate the internal market, as a first stage, in the ilk of the agreement with Ukraine.
Thirdly, the European Union should commit to start active mediation in the numerous bilateral disputes "because all of these problems have to be solved prior to the countries joining," as Jean-Claude Juncker declared on 9th January 2018, as he advocated their use of the arbitration services of the ICJ if necessary. But to avoid the situation in which the arbitration decision is rejected - as Croatia did with Slovenia - European funds would again be conditioned according to its respect. As for Serbia-Kosovo dialogue it has, in the eyes of both parties, become ridiculous with each deeming itself to be victim of the other's bad faith. Since facilitation is no longer enough, active engagement by the High Representative has become necessary with follow-up given to the decisions taken.
Fourthly, "civil society" should be invited to play the fourth pillar in the pre-membership process at different levels in which its role is vital, notably for the implementation of chapters 23 and 24 and by civil action for reconciliation that the Union ought to finance. Finally, the integration of the Roma communities should become a national priority of the governments thanks to significant measures taken notably in terms of housing, education and vocational training, especially since most of the Balkan region will be witnessing dramatic demographic decline.
Although the political classes in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo deem that the European Union owes them preferential treatment, the Balkan leaders realise that the interest that the EU has, in the main, a great deal more to do with their geostrategic position and the dangers that the failure of their transition would imply. And they know how to play on this. They also know that the Union and its public opinion, given the many internal problems they face are not in a hurry to receive them. It would however be dangerous for lukewarm support to dominate over the Union's strategic interest, since the stability of the Western Balkans is a guarantee of our security. Indeed, the European Union should "open up to the countries of the Balkans ... it is a condition for them not to turn their backs on Europe and move either towards Russia or Turkey or towards authoritarian powers which do not defend our values," as President Macron declared in a speech that marked the end of the return of France on the European stage.
The integration process there is an investment in Europe's security that public opinion would accept more easily if a "partnership" substituted Turkey's membership project as suggested by Emmanuel Macron on Recep Tayyip Erdogan's visit to Paris on 5th January 2018. It is time for the Union to launch a strong initiative to make its re-engagement in the Western Balkans even firmer, by honouring the promise made fifteen years ago in Thessaloniki, to reduce the attraction of external sirens and to prevent further violent crises. As Federica Mogherini declared in Sarajevo on 4th March 2017 after a difficult visit to the Balkans: "What is at stake here is peace, stability, security and economic opportunities for all, regional cooperation, and what I might call, the reunification of our continent."